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    There have been various empirical researches on the effects of income 
distribution on economic growth.  Although studies using cross-country 
data used to be common, recent researches started to use regional panel-data 
within one country.  This paper uses Japanese prefectural panel data to 
analyze how income distribution affects economic growth.
   The measures of the income distribution used in the estimations are 
the income share of the third quintile and the Gini indices.  In the fixed 
effects estimations and the GMM estimations, the income share of the third 
quintile has positive and statistically significant effects on five-year 
economic growth rates. On the other hand, the Gini indices have positive 
and statistically significant effects on both of the five-year and ten-year 
economic growth rates in the fixed effects estimations, and negative effect on 
the five-year growth rate in the GMM once. These results are the similar to
one of the existing literatures and can be explained with the modified 
median voter theory.
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21. Introduction
There have been various empirical and theoretical researches on this 
topic. According to Weil (2013), income equality affects economic growth 
through four channels.  These four channels are the accumulation of 
physical capital, the accumulation of human capital, government 
redistribution policy, and sociopolitical instability.
     In recent Japan, active discussion on the possibility of increase in 
income inequality was conducted (Otake 2005, Tachibanaki 2004, 2006), and 
the increase of inequality people felt became social problem for several years.  
In addition, recent increase of the maximum rate for income taxes and 
increase of inheritance taxes can be considered as the increase of 
government’s income redistribution.  Such increase or decrease in income 
inequality can affect economic growth, and that effect is estimated in this 
research.  
In the figure 1, the transition of the Gini index in the Survey on the 
redistribution of income and the National Survey of family income and 
expenditure are shown.  The red line shows the Gini index on the income 
before redistribution, and it has been increasing sharply.  However, the 
income after redistribution shown by the blue line increased more slowly 
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3look at the violet line which shows the Gini index of the National Survey of 
family income and expenditure, it is low but increasing since 1979.  
     In the existing empirical researches, the effects of income distribution 
on economic growth are different, depending on data and estimation methods.  
Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that equality has positive and significant 
effects on growth, using historical panel data and post-war cross-country 
data.  Perotti (1996) used cross-country data and also found that equality 
has positive effect on growth.  Forbes (2000) and Li and Zou (1998) used 
cross-country panel data and found opposite evidence that equality decreases 
growth.  
     Weil (2013) explains the reason why it is difficult to find out the effect 
of income distribution on economic growth is that the effect may depend on a 
county’s stage of growth, as well as other factors such as whether a country is 
open to capital flows from abroad.
     On the other hand, recently, Panizza (2002), Partridge (1997), Atems
(2013) etc. conducted researches using panel data of U.S. states.  According 
to Panizza (2002), while most cross-country studies find a positive 
relationship between income equality and economic growth, most existing 
studies that use panel data suggest the presence of a negative relationship 
between income equality and growth.  The research in Panizza (2002), 
however, found some evidence in support of a positive relationship between 
equality and growth, using a panel data of the 48 states of the continental 
US for the 1940-1980 period.  Atems (2013) also used U.S. county panel 
data to estimate dynamic spatial Durbin model, and found that the direct 
effect of a one-point increase in a county’s inequality is associated with a 
3.3% decrease in its growth, while one-point increase in inequality in a 
county’s neighbors decrease its growth by 4.8%.
     Partridge (1997) also used panel data of U.S. states and found out that 
equality measured with the Gini index has negative and significant effect on 
growth, and that equality measured with the income share of the third 
quintile has positive and significant effect on growth.  This research used 
Japanese prefectural panel data in estimation and found the same effects as 
Partridge (1997).  Partridge explain the result the median voter theory, and 
this can also be applied to Japanese results.  
     Using a regional panel data within one country has an advantage that 
the county’s stage of growth, other factors such as whether a country is open 
4to capital flows from abroad, and the measurement method of equality are 
the same.  Therefore, in this paper, empirical investigation using 
prefectural panel data in Japan is conducted, following the recent empirical 
researches.  Since such research using Japanese panel data has not been 
conducted yet, it is important to find out what kind of effects such data 
shows.
     This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 illustrates data set; 
Section 3 presents the results of estimation; Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
     In this paper, Japanese prefectural panel date is used in estimation.  
The summary statistics is shown in table 1, and the correlation matrix is 
shown in table 2.
     Data is a panel for 47 prefectures for the 1980 (1979 for Gini 
coefficients) - 2010, every 5 years for 6 periods.  Growth 5 is the five-year 
average annual growth rate from the base year, growth10 is the ten-year 
average annual growth rate of each prefecture.  LogIncome is the natural 
log of the average per capita income in prefectures. These data are obtained 
                    Table 1. Summary Statistics
No.of 
obs.
Average S.E. Minimum Maximum
growth5 282 0.0117 0.0245 -0.0375 0.0654 
growth10 141 0.0145 0.0253 -0.0200 0.0627 
LogIncome 329 3.3730 0.110997 3.0790 3.6646 
Gini 282 0.2523 0.0850 0.0590 0.3800 
Q3 282 0.1769 0.0045 0.1565 0.1892 
HighSchool 282 41.1663 5.8431 25.0151 56.8238 
College 282 20.1745 8.2518 7.3391 47.6881 
Agriculture 282 10.2585 6.0017 0.4000 26.6000 
Urban 282 48.5993 18.5704 23.4000 98.0000 
Old 282 16.7283 4.6685 6.1636 27.1352 
Manufacturing 282 20.8058 6.5005 4.9178 34.6487 
FinanInsRealEst 282 3.3291 0.9038 2.0771 7.0241 
Government 282 3.7017 0.8064 2.2581 6.7096 
5
6or calculated from “the Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts” released by 
the Cabinet Office.
     Gini is the Gini index and Q3 is the income share of the third quintile 
in 47 prefectures, and both data are obtained or calculated from “the 
National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure.”  Table 2 shows that 
the correlation between the Gini index and Q3 is -0.378.  The Gini index is 
the established measure of income distribution, and the negative correlation 
with the Gini index shows that Q3 is the measure of income equality.
     Also, the figure 2 shows the change of the income share of the third 
quintile (Q3) at the horizontal axis, and the change of the income share of the 
first and second quintiles (Q1 and Q2) and that of the richer fourth and fifth 
quintiles (Q4 and Q5) at the vertical axis.  This figure shows that when the 
income share of the middle class increases, income share of the poorer 
quintiles tend to increase and the income share of the richer quintiles tend to 
decrease.  Therefore, we can interpret that the overall income equality 
tends to increase when Q3 increases.
7Following Panizza (2002), Partridge (1997) and Perotti (1996), other
variables are the average skills of the labor force (HighSchool is the 
percentage of the population over 15 years old that have graduated from 
high school, but not a college, and College is the percentage that graduated 
from two- or four-year college or graduate school) and they are from “the 
employment status survey.”  The degree of urbanization (Urban measures 
the fraction of the population that lives in urban areas), age structure (Old 
measures the percentage of the population above 65 years of age), and
industrial structure (Agriculture, Manufacturing, FinanInsRealEst, 
Government measure the percentage of the population employed in 
agriculture; construction; manufacturing; finance, insurance, and real 
estate; and government) are also used. Agriculture, Urban are data from 
“Statistical Indicator of Social Life –Prefectural Indicator－” by the Statistics 
Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.  Old, 
Construction, Manufacturing, FinanInsRealEst, Government are from “the 
Population Census.”
3. Estimations
    In this section, the results of OLS and fixed effects estimations are 
shown.  First, the basic simple regression of the following equation is 
conducted:
      ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜ = ߚݕ௜ + ߛܦܫܴܵܶܫ௜ + ߠܺ௜ + ߝ௜                    (1)
where ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ௜ is the prefecture i’s annual growth rate of income per capita, ݕ௜ is prefecture i’s natural log of income per capita,	ܦܫܴܵܶܫ௧,௜	is a variable 
capturing income distribution (measured using the income share of the third 
quintile or the Gini index) and ܺ௜ is the prefecture i’s matrix of controls.  
The matrix ܺ௜ includes stock of human capital (HighSchool and College), the 
degree of urbanization (Urban), age structure (Old) and the initial industrial 
mix of the prefecture (Agriculture, Manufacturing FinanInsRealEst, 
Government).
     First, I estimated equation (1) with pooled OLS and the result is shown
in table 3.  They suggest that income share of the 3rd quintile has positive or 
negative significant effects on growth, depending on the length of growth 
episodes.  As for the Gini indexes, they have positive effects on five-year 
8Table 3. Pooled OLS Estimation: Five and ten-year growth episodes
Length of Growth Episodes
5 years 10 years
LogIncome -0.160 -0.181 -0.189 -0.182 -0.082 -0.060 
(-13.28)*** (-10.67)*** (-10.78)*** (-18.06)*** ( -4.93)*** (-3.64)***
Q3 0.160 0.319 -0.121 -0.576 
( 0.92) (1.70)* (-0.76) (-4.12)***
Gini 0.032 0.044 -0.115 -0.142 
(1.74 )* (2.26)** (-7.00)*** (-8.43)***
HighSchool -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
(-1.99)** (-1.89)* (-2.14)** (0.67) (-0.85) (-0.70)
College -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0005 
(-5.85)*** (-4.95)*** (-4.73)*** ( -0.21) ( -2.80)** (-3.45)***
Urban 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
(4.36)*** (4.14)*** ( 4.14)*** (0.64) ( 0.20) (-0.27)
Old 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0001 
(6.79)*** (3.90)*** (3.39)*** (-2.42)** (-0.51) (-0.39)
Agriculture 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 
(3.83)*** (3.94)*** (3.41)*** (0.98) (0.44) (0.90)
Manufacturing 0.0024 0.0025 0.0023 0.0010 0.0006 0.0006 
(8.88)*** (9.35)*** (8.58)*** (3.51)*** (2.40)** ( 2.73)***
FinanInsRealEst 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.004 
(8.79)*** (8.29)*** (7.98)*** (2.96)*** (3.35)*** (3.58)***
Government 0.0041 0.0032 0.0027 -0.0021 0.0003 0.0009 
(2.34)** (1.79)* (1.45) (-1.25) (0.22) (0.64)
Constant 0.400 0.499 0.476 0.626 0.306 0.337 
(7.58)*** (8.20)*** (7.66)*** (13.37)*** (5.73)*** (6.62)***
Adj. R2 0.844 0.845 0.846 0.926 0.946 0.952 
N.obs. 282 282 282 141 141 141
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
9growth rate and negative effects on ten-year growth rate.  Therefore, in the 
OLS estimations, the effects of the income distribution on economic growth 
are mixed and not very clear.  
In addition, in the following fixed effects estimations, F-tests which test 
the null hypothesis that all prefecture-specific fixed effects ߙ௜ are zero were 
conducted.  As the table 4 and table 5 show, The test results always reject 
the null hypothesis, so there exist unobservable prefecture-specific fixed 
effects and therefore the fixed effects estimations are preferred over pooled 
OLS estimations.
Therefore, this paper shows the results of estimating the following 
fixed effects model:
ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ(௧,௧ା௡),௜ = ߚݕ௧,௜ + ߛܦܫܴܵܶܫ௧,௜ + ߠܺ௧,௜ + ߙ௜ + ߟ௧ + ߝ௧,௜  (2)
In this equation, ܩݎ݋ݓݐℎ(௧,௧ା௡) is the average annual growth rate of 
prefectural income from year t to t+n,  ߙ௜ denotes the prefecture i’s 
unobservable prefecture-specific effect, ߟ௧ denotes a period-specific intercept, 
and ߝ௧,௜ is the remainder stochastic disturbance term.  The estimation 
results are shown in table4 and 5.
     In order to decide which of the random effects and fixed effects 
estimation should be adopted, the Hausman test results are shown in the 
bottom of these two tables.  When Hausman test is effective, it always reject 
the null that explanatory variables ܺ௧,௜ and the prefecture-specific effect ߙ௜
is not correlated.  This means that random effects estimates are not 
consistent and fixed effects estimations should be adopted rather than 
random effects estimations.  Therefore, the estimation results of fixed 
effects are shown.
     In the fixed effects estimation with five-year growth episodes in table 4, 
the income share of the third quintile (Q3) have positive and significant 
effects on growth most of the time, and the Gini index also has positive and 
statistically significant effects on growth in most estimations.  
In the table 5, the fixed effects estimation with ten-year growth 
episodes are reported.  In this table, the income share of the third quintile 
(Q3) has negative but insignificant effects, and the Gini index have positive 
and mostly statistically significant effects on the economic growth.
These fixed effects estimation results of table 4 and 5 may be biased by 
10
Table 4. Fixed effects estimations: Five-year growth episodes.
No controls Controls Controls and period dummies
LogIncome -0.234 -0.388 -0.383 -0.183 -0.284 -0.313 -0.381 -0.383 -0.384 
(-26.02)*** (-30.00)*** (-32.42)*** (-10.30)*** (-12.35)*** (-13.45)*** (-12.73)*** (-12.83)*** (-12.81)***
Q3 0.829 1.297 0.250 0.675 0.280 0.098 
(3.21)*** (6.93)*** (1.47) (4.17)*** (1.92)* (0.50)
Gini 0.196 0.212 0.167 0.206 -0.110 -0.089 
(12.79)*** (14.99)*** (6.37)*** (7.63)*** (-2.33)** (-1.40)
HighSchool 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
( 0.34) (0.48) (-0.14 ) (-0.26) (0.00 ) (-0.04)
College -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-2.77)*** (-2.15)** (-1.83)* (-1.00) (-0.89) (-0.91)
Urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.18) (-0.82) (-0.54) (-0.96) (-0.91) (-0.89)
Old 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(12.34)*** (-0.02) (-1.18) ( -2.08)** (-1.98)** (-2.00)**
Agriculture 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(4.52)*** (1.74)* ( 0.76) (0.96) (1.22) ( 1.18)
Manufacturing 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(4.69)*** (3.38) (2.94)*** (2.88)*** ( 2.81)*** ( 2.83)***
FinanInsRealEst 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
(2.88)*** (-0.11) (-0.22) (0.18) (0.37) (0.37 )
Government -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(-0.53) (-0.28) (0.34) (1.15) (1.14) (1.17)
Constant 0.662 1.276 1.026 0.450 0.917 0.892 1.189 1.241 1.224 
(10.41)*** (31.67)*** ( 19.92)*** (6.13)*** (10.15)*** (10.20)*** (11.16)*** (11.92)*** (11.20)***
Overall R2 0.5951 0.4709 0.4936 0.7192 0.5554 0.5881 0.5213 0.5278 0.5282
F rest that all ߙ௜ = 0 4.67*** 11.29*** 13.90*** 5.21*** 6.82*** 7.56*** 3.28*** 3.86*** 3.85***
Hausman Test -214.97 -32105.16 -2165.86 -103.31 -217.32 -147.32 183.59*** 187.71*** 185.77***
N.obs. 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
   * Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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Table 5. Fixed effects estimations: Ten-year growth episodes.
No controls Controls Controls and period dummies
LogIncome -0.219 -0.296 -0.307 -0.199 -0.246 -0.246 -0.260 -0.261 -0.260 
(-46.73)*** (-13.69)*** (-13.39)*** (-13.80)*** (-12.41)*** (-11.05)*** (-10.69 )*** (-10.70)*** (-10.58)***
Q3 -0.050 0.265 -0.197 -0.001 -0.122 -0.143 
(-0.26) (1.37) (-1.40) ( -0.01) (-0.88) (-0.74)
Gini 0.088 0.103 0.000 0.062 0.062 0.021 -0.009 
(3.64)*** (3.90)*** (0.08) (3.07)*** (2.69)*** (0.50) (-0.16)
HighSchool 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-1.04) (0.41) (0.41) (0.79) (0.82) (0.80)
College 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.39) ( -1.11) (-1.09) ( -0.08) (-0.02) (-0.06)
Urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.36) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.46) (-0.40) (-0.46)
Old 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.36) (-0.14) ( -0.14) ( 0.03) (0.10) (0.02)
Agriculture 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
( 0.49) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.21) (0.28)
Manufacturing 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.93)* ( 1.65) (1.64) (1.31) (1.28) (1.31)
FinanInsRealEst 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.56) ( -0.26) (-0.26) (-0.22) (-0.20) (-0.18)
Government 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.45) (0.61) (0.59) (0.68) (0.74) ( 0.69)
Constant 0.761 0.991 0.977 0.688 0.815 0.815 0.872 0.852 0.876 
(17.99)*** (14.72)*** (14.39)*** (11.60)*** (11.06)*** (10.98)*** (10.24)*** (10.23)*** (9.75)***
Overall R2 0.772 0.662 0.646 0.815 0.701 0.701 0.699 0.700 0.700 
F rest that all ߙ௜ = 0 11.16*** 4.09*** 3.82*** 6.52*** 4.79*** 3.97*** 3.30*** 3.28*** 3.25***
Hausman Test -44.86 163.57*** 157.56*** -5.94 467.37*** 1396.81*** 179.34*** 118.18*** 173.72***
N.obs. 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
   * Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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the fact that equation (2) contains a lag of the dependent variable (Panizza 
2002; Caselli et al. 1996; Judson and Owen 1999).  In order to address this 
point, I re-estimated the equation (2) with the robust GMM estimators 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  The estimation results are shown 
in table 6.  
     In table 6, changes of Q3 sometimes have positive and significant 
effects on growth, and changes in the Gini indices have negative and 
significant effect on changes in growth once.  The positive effects of changes 
of Q3 are the same as those in fixed effects estimations.  However, the 
negative effect of changes in the Gini is the opposite from the fixed effects 
estimations although the coefficient is statistically significant only in the 
estimation without Q3 and with period dummies.   
    Therefore, if the income of the third quintile is used as the equality 
measure, (changes in) income equality enhances the (changes in) economic 
growth.  However, when (changes in) the Gini indices are used, (changes in) 
the income equality decreases (changes in) economic growth most of the time.  
Thus, the results are the same as those in Partridge (1997).  
     Partridge (1997) used the U.S. state panel data and explained the Q3 
results with a positive relationship between the median voter’s relative 
well-being and economic growth as suggested by the Persson and Tabellini
(1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994).  In addition, Partridge (1997) 
explained the result of the Gini index also with the median voter theory after 
modest modification.  That is, by assuming that the likelihood of 
growth-enhancing policies increases as higher-income groups gain political 
power relative to lower-income groups.  That is what the positive 
Gini-economic growth relationship may reflect.
     The results from Japanese data can also be explained with this 
modified median voter theory.  Although Japanese prefectural governments 
are more centralized than U.S. state governments, Doi (1999) empirically 
showed that the median voter theory also applies to Japanese prefectural 
governments.
     As for other independent variables, if the initial income level is higher, 
growth rate is lower, which means that prefectural per capita incomes tend
to converge.  The human capital measured by the shares of high school 
graduates and college graduates have negative effects on growth, which are 
opposite signs from the expected.  In addition, larger share of employment 
13
Table 6. GMM Estimations
(Dependent variables: growth rate in 5 years)
No period dummies Period dummies
LogIncome -0.515 -0.552 -0.584 -0.740 -0.739 -0.741 
(.038)*** (.041)*** (.048)*** (.050)*** (.047)*** (.048)***
Q3 0.208 0.396 0.297 0.158 
(.151) (.2284)* (.1592)* (.2227)
Gini -0.013 0.067 -0.094 -0.057 
(.0388) (.0606) (.0471)** (.06631)
HighSchool 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0003) (.0003) (.0002)* (.0006)** (.0006)* (.0005)*
College 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
Urban 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(.0006) (.0005) (.0005) (.0005) (0.0005) (.0005)
Old -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(.001)*** (.001)*** (.001)** (.001)** (.001)** (.001)**
Agriculture -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(.0013) (.0014) (.0013) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
Manufacturing 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(.0010) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)** (.0009)** (.0009)*
FinanInsRealEst 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.006 0.006 
(.0060) (.0059) (.0058) (.0053) (.0051) (.0054)
Government 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
( .0073) (.0068) (.0067) (.0058) (.0059) (.005)
Constant 1.730 1.856 1.776 2.476 2.560 2.550 
(.173)*** (.165)*** (.178)*** (.227)*** (.221)*** (.241)***
N. obs. 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* Denotes a parameter which is significant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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in agriculture, manufacturing, finance, insurance and real estate and
government sometimes raise the growth rate, and larger share of old people 
increases or decreases the growth rate.
4. Conclusion
     In this paper, prefectural panel data of Japan is used for the first time 
to investigate how income equality affects economic growth.  As a result of 
estimations and tests using data from 1979 to 2010, the fixed effect
estimation and GMM estimation results are chosen.  In the fixed effect 
estimations, income equality affects five-year growth positively and 
statistically significantly, if equality is measured with the income share of 
the third quintile.  However, income equality affects growth negatively and 
statistically significantly if equality is measured with the Gini index.  In the 
GMM estimations with the Q3, equality enhances growth again.  These 
estimation results are the very similar to those with Partridge (1997), and 
can be explained with the modified median voter theory.
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